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Abstract — Electricity market design varies across countries 
throughout Europe. Thereby the provision and remuneration of 
flexibility always takes place in short-term market segments. 
Taking into consideration the fundamental changes of the power 
system, this paper discusses options for the future short-term 
market design. We develop a conceptual basis for a possible 
integration of currently separated short-term market segments. 
Market segment integration (MSI) is defined as the interaction 
between and possible combination of market segments, i.e. 
intraday market (ID), congestion management (CM) and 
balancing market (BA). The paper especially focusses on two 
options, namely an integrated BA and CM market and an 
integrated ID and CM market. For these options we determine 
the basic design features. We propose a criteria catalogue which 
allows the evaluation of the market design options. Based on 
several criteria we discuss possible positive and negative 
consequences as well as potential solutions.  
Index Terms — balancing market; congestion management; 
intraday market; market design; market segment integration 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Driven by EU regulation, Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) and Power Exchanges are working on market 
integration by coupling (national) short-term power markets to 
reach the EU target model. In addition to these well-known 
activities, we go a step further and develop a conceptual basis 
for a possible integration of separated market segments. The 
(market) segments referred to are the intraday market (ID), the 
balancing market (BA), and congestion management1 (CM). 
We thereby question the current structure of short-term market 
segments as the same flexibility can be offered and used for 
multiple purposes. Flexibility providers need to choose where 
to offer their services, being affected in their decision due to 
overlapping trading times, different market prices, and the 
variety of product specifications. An option to prevent 
possible resulting problems like a liquidity split is the 
                                                           
1 Certainly, the term CM includes a variety of measures, whereas we focus 
on congestion problems within a bidding zone (see also II A.) Although there 
is no market-based approach for redispatch procedures implemented in 
Germany, we use the term “market segment” for pragmatic reasons for all 
three discussed segments.  
integration of these fragmented short-term markets. By market 
segment integration (MSI) we understand the interaction 
between and possible combination of market segments, i.e. ID, 
CM and BA. A co-optimization, for instance, of the BA and 
CM processes could not only unlock flexibility to the system 
but also holds a potential for increasing the overall economic 
benefit. Moreover current EU legislation [1] suggests the 
implementation of a market-based approach for dealing with 
congestions what gives another impetus to rethink the 
short-term electricity market design. 
II. STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPLES OF SHORT-TERM 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS  
A. Description of the Status-Quo 
In the current short-term market design of Germany, the 
market segments ID, BA and CM are strictly separated. The 
rationales and structure of each market segment will be 
discussed in the following, focusing on the German case. 
Although electricity spot markets consist of the day-ahead 
market and the ID we will focus on the latter one as flexibility 
is being traded here in the short-term starting after 3 p.m. on 
the day before delivery until gate closure time (GCT) 30 
minutes before delivery. Market participants can optimize 
their portfolio in order to uphold balancing group 
commitments with regards to the imbalance settlement period 
(ISP) of 15 minutes. As the current market design is based on 
a zonal approach, the location of the bid is irrelevant. The ID 
is a two-sided trading that takes place over-the-counter or at 
power exchanges – in the case of Germany at EPEX SPOT 
and Nord Pool. Market parties can trade quarter hourly 
products in the ID auction and/or quarter-hourly respectively 
hourly products in the continuous intraday trading. Especially 
due to the increased penetration of wind and solar energy, the 
need to update production forecasts led to a strong increase of 
trading volume in the intraday time frame. The traded volume 
at the power exchange EPEX SPOT increased from 6 TWh in 
2009 to 41 TWh in 2016 in the German-Austrian bidding 
zone, [2], [3].  
The BA is designed with a single-sided buyer auction with 
the TSO as single buyer that has to ensure the balance 
between electricity generation and consumption within the 
control area at all times. On the BA the products Frequency 
Containment Reserves (FCR), Automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserves (aFRR) and Manual Frequency 
Restoration Reserves (mFRR) are tendered. There are 
different products for positive and negative capacity in aFRR 
and mFRR. FCR is tendered as a symmetric product. The TSO 
reserves capacities for all three products. The remuneration of 
the products is split into the capacity price (€/MW), which is 
paid for every accepted bid, and – in case of aFRR and 
mFRR – the energy price (€/MWh), which is paid for every 
activated bid. The acceptance of bids is determined by the 
merit order of the capacity price. The order of activation is 
determined by the merit order of the energy prices, whereas 
the pricing method (at least for the time being) is pay-as-bid. 
Also, for this market segment, the location of participating 
units is irrelevant and furthermore, a pooling on control area 
level is allowed [4]. On average, in the year 2016 capacities of 
around 2000 MW were reserved for positive and negative 
mFRR. However, mFRR is used in times of high imbalances 
only. In 2016, around 0.174 TWh (positive balancing energy) 
and 0.054 TWh (negative balancing energy) was used for 
balancing the system.  
As future development, there is a discussion on the 
introduction of a balancing energy market for mFRR and 
potentially aFRR close to delivery as a complement to the 
existing scheme [5]. Market participants with remaining 
flexibility could bid an energy price (€/MWh) into the 
balancing energy market without participating in the capacity 
auction beforehand. This creates an increased competition for 
balancing energy prices and extends the balancing energy 
merit-order list. The TSO then is using the entire merit-order 
list for the respective activation, without distinction between 
procured and non-procured bids. 
As a third segment, CM is necessary if grid capacity is 
scarce and measures are needed to prevent or resolve power- 
or voltage-related violations in the grid. Congestions can be 
differentiated by their point of origin (transmission level, 
distribution level, or between transmission and distribution 
level). Additionally, one can distinguish congestions between 
bidding zones and congestions within a bidding zone. The 
focus of this paper is on the latter one. Since it lays in the 
nature of a local congestion problem, the geographical 
information of the offered capacities are of high relevance. 
CM includes several measures such as redispatching of 
conventional power plants, load management and curtailment 
of renewable energy sources. In the past, a cost-based 
redispatch approach was the basis for the remuneration of 
redispatched units. However, a recent court decision [6] 
clarified that i.a. opportunity costs need to be remunerated as 
well. Another development is a recent legislative proposal by 
the European Commission [1] to introduce redispatch markets 
wherever possible. For the time being a German TSO can 
request every power plant (≥ 10 MW) to in- or decrease their 
energy generation compared to their schedule. Power plants 
are obliged (by EnWG § 13 Abs. 1) to follow these 
instructions. Due to an unprecedented extension of renewable 
energy sources and not yet sufficient transmission capacity of 
the grid, the amount of redispatch strongly grew in the recent 
years from 2 TWh in 2013 to 16 TWh in 2015 [2] and further 
increase is expected. 
B. Comparison of the market segments 
The timelines of the respective market segments are 
depicted in Figure 1. The discussed short-term market 
segments have overlapping time frames, especially in the (so 
far hypothetical) case of an existing balancing energy and 
redispatch market.  
  
 
Figure 1. Timelines of the respective market segments 
 
III. OPTIONS OF INTEGRATING MARKET SEGMENTS 
A. Listing of the options of MSI 
Figure 2 shows the possible four combinations to integrate the 
three short-term market segments ID, BA and CM.  
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic overview of MSI options 
When we talk about integration we do not necessarily 
mean the complete integration leading to a unified market for 
the integrated market segments, but also lower degrees of 
integration. This includes the interaction between and the 
combination of market segments.2 One example for 
integrating BA and ID is to allow the TSO to procure energy 
for system imbalance reasons on the ID. We consider the 
integration of all three market segments is the most visionary 
MSI option. Due to pragmatic reasons we will particularly 
focus on the options “integration of BA and CM” as well as 
“integration of ID and CM” in subchapter B.  
 
B. Description of MSI options 
Every option of MSI represents a design of a highly 
complex and multifaceted market. Therefore the following 
descriptions do not aim to finally and completely describe the 
market design. We will rather determine the basic structure 
and the fundamental design features. 
 
a) Integration of BA and CM  
An example for the integration of the market segments BA 
and CM is given by the market design in several countries 
                                                          
2 To illustrate, the possibility to optimize the activation of units within the 
balancing and congestion segment (“co-optimization”) differentiates 
significantly from integrating the respective segments within one market. 
within Europe, e.g. the United Kingdom (UK). In its balancing 
mechanism a co-optimization between BA and CM ensures an 
efficient use of capacities at all times [7]. Another example is 
given by the TSO Swissgrid Ltd., who suggested to integrate 
current products of mFRR and CM into one energy product 
procured by the TSO [8].  
For the integration of BA and CM in Germany the BA 
could be extended such that the TSO is free to activate the bid 
either for balancing or for congestion purposes3. This option is 
also mentioned in the Electricity Balancing Guideline (EBGL) 
after which each TSO shall have the right to also activate 
balancing energy bids for purposes other than balancing, i.e. 
for ensuring operational security [9]. As both BA and CM, in 
the current framework, work in a 15 minute pattern and on a 
scheduled basis, it is appropriate to also orient the integrated 
design at quarter-hourly products. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to consider only the mFRR product for this option 
of MSI. The inclusion of an aFRR product is also conceivable 
but adds complexity and is therefore not considered in this 
paper. Due to CM, every bid needs to entail local information 
(e.g. grid connection point). Furthermore, the gate opening 
time (GOT) and GCT for the common market are important 
design features. In the UK, the TSO receives the first schedule 
and prices for ramping up or down at 11 a.m. the day before 
delivery; this schedule can be changed until the GCT of the 
ID. One option is that the GCT is shortly after or 
simultaneously with the GCT of the ID. The settlement for 
respectively up and down regulation can be – in accordance 
with the EU balancing target model – at a uniform price 
(marginal pricing) [9].  
Currently, the legal framework prohibits the interaction of 
BA and CM in Germany. This is due to the resolution the 
German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) passed in 
2012 that prescribes separation of balancing and congestion 
measures. According to [10] it is not proportionate to use the 
redispatch mechanism for balancing the system. Furthermore, 
the use of reserved balancing capacity for grid issues is 
prohibited as thereby remaining balancing resources are 
reduced. In the case of a significant imbalance this could lead 
to insufficient availability of balancing power [10]. Hence, in 
an integrated BA and CM market it needs to be ensured that 
the dimensioning of reserves takes into account both balancing 
and congestion needs4. However, it needs to be analyzed if a 
resulting increase in procured capacity in the balancing 
mechanism is efficient from an economic point of view. The 
above mentioned balancing energy market, though, is a 
promising option to introduce a possibility to use these bids 
for both discussed operational purposes. 
b) Integration of ID and CM  
The idea of integrating the ID with the CM in Germany 
refers to the continuous ID trade – not the auction. This MSI 
option includes a process whereby the TSO and the 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) can procure energy for 
CM purposes on a platform that also performs ID trading of 
                                                           
3 Also other publications discuss this MSI option such as [13]. 
4 The TSO currently analyses to switch reserve dimensioning from a 
quarterly process to a process on a daily basis which can be a relevant aspect 
within this discussion.  
market parties. Both bids for ID and for CM services could 
have equivalent product specifications such as a quarter-
hourly product. Moreover, products require an indication of 
their physical location of delivery (e.g. grid connection point). 
A "buy-order" on the ID would constitute a relative energy 
withdrawal at a specific location. A "sell-order" would 
subsequently lead to a local energy injection. The system 
operator would use buy-orders within congested areas, and 
sell-orders outside congested areas. Such integration has 
various aspects to be decided on: Within the scope of this 
paper the ID is not expected to be the exclusive source for CM 
services but a supplement to other (market-based or non-
market based) TSO/DSO redispatch processes. The indication 
of delivery location can be voluntary or obligatory, noting that 
obligatory indication of location seems somewhat 
contradictory to zonal electricity market designs. Furthermore, 
it needs to be defined whether the system operator acts as an 
active participant by placing orders or a reactive participant 
only accepting existing bids. 
An early GOT gives the TSO the possibility to react on 
predicted congestions at an early stage. The GCT of this MSI 
could be – as in the existing continuous ID trade – close to 
delivery.  
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A CRITERIA-CATALOGUE FOR AN 
EVALUATION OF THE MARKET CONCEPTS 
A. Definition of criteria  
For an evaluation of any market design model, a list of 
objective criteria should be the basis to assess both the 
possible positive and negative consequences. We therefore 
present the following criteria including a short description to 
evaluate the two selected MSI options. Although this list of 
criteria is not necessarily conclusive, we believe that these 
criteria are crucial when assessing market design options. 
 
a) Market Liquidity 
Market liquidity serves as a quality indicator for a market. 
Sufficient liquidity enables a functional interaction between 
supply and demand to find its equilibrium on a settled volume 
against a certain price. Sufficient liquidity also increases the 
price deviation resilience if certain bids would be kept out of 
the market, with a relative small price difference for the 
settled volume. Due to the multidimensionality of liquidity 
there is no unequivocal measurand. The different measurands 
can be categorized into four categories: (1) The transaction 
cost measures (e.g. the Bid-ask spread), (2) the volume-based 
measures (e.g. trading volume), (3) the price-based measures 
and (4) the market impact measures [11]. 
 
b) Influence on price formation  
Electricity markets – like every other – consist of market 
participants that aim to maximize their profit. This 
understanding explains the central importance of price 
incentives and revenue possibilities for market participants. 
Any influences on the price formation process by a MSI 
should be carefully evaluated. Therefore, possible effects on 
spot, balancing and imbalance prices need to be analyzed. 
Particular attention is given to possible influences on the 
imbalance price (IP). The IP [€/ MWh] “means the price, be it 
positive, zero or negative, in each imbalance settlement 
period for an imbalance in each direction” [9] It serves as the 
central incentive for a Balancing Responsible Party (BRP) to 
be balanced over the ISP and therefore possible influences 
need to be carefully evaluated. 
 
c) Effect on market participants 
If markets have overlapping time periods, similar products 
and a similar pool of suppliers, these market participants have 
a decision problem on which market to offer their flexibility, 
which is especially a problem for smaller participants. MSI 
can possibly reduce the decision making problem of market 
participants and thus improve overall efficiency. 
Furthermore, adding locational information to bids has 
various impacts on the market participants. We consider the 
influence on the revenue structure of market participants and 
possible distributional effects. 
 
d) Consistency of responsibilities 
In unbundled power systems the market design requires a 
set of roles that fulfil certain tasks and that have clear 
responsibilities defined (e.g. TSO, DSO, and BRP). The tasks 
of the TSO constitute in the BA, where the TSO procures 
services to balance the power of its control area. A criterion 
to be evaluated when integrating market segments is the 
impact on responsibilities: Is the integration leading to an 
overlap or a gap of responsibilities? Can operator tasks be 
ensured on integrated markets where the operator is no longer 
the single-buyer? 
 
e) Market power 
Market power is the ability of single or a small group of 
market participants to significantly influence the market 
price. A central measurand for the market power is the market 
concentration which indicates to which degree only a few 
market participants control the market. In any integration 
option which incorporates CM, this issue needs to be 
discussed. Due to the local character, individual market 
participants may influence the price formation process. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate the market power 
potential and to ensure the existence of appropriate counter-
measures. Possible counter-measures are to enlarge the 
possible pool of providers by e.g. granting access also for 
small participants or strengthening the market surveillance 
authority.  
 
f) Supporting system operater´s possibilities to (re)act 
It is the responsibility of the TSO to maintain the system 
security by notably balancing the system and solving 
congestions. In order to achieve this, sufficient possibilities 
need to be given to the TSO. This criterion examines whether 
and to what extent the possibilities of the TSO to procure 
ancillary services are improved by the respective MSI. 
 
g) Complexity of implementation 
This criterion is dealing with (i) the feasibility of the 
technical realization and (ii) implementation costs which 
should not exceed the benefits resulting by a certain MSI 
option and (iii) the participants that would be directly affected 
by a conversion (e.g. TSO, generators and power exchanges).  
 
h) Compatibility with the existing regulation 
A possible reorganization of the market design requires an 
assessment of the compatibility with the regulatory 
framework and legal basis (e.g. network codes). The current 
framework for instance foresees a zonal market structure. 
Therefore it needs to be analyzed if and to what extent MSI 
could influence or potentially undermine the functionality of 
the European internal market. 
 
V. EVALUATION OF THE OPTIONS OF MSI BY MEANS OF 
SELECTED CRITERIA 
In this section the integration of BA and CM as well as 
the integration of ID and CM are evaluated with a subset of 
the above mentioned criteria. It is not intended as a 
comprehensive assessment, but rather as an explanatory 
exercise to show evaluation approaches as well as remaining 
questions for future research. Therefore, we limit our 
evaluation to the criteria market liquidity, influence on price 
formation and effect on market participants. 
 
A. Integration of BA and CM 
a) Market Liquidity 
As explained earlier, in the current system the TSO cannot 
use balancing capacities for solving congestions and vice 
versa. To be specific, an amount of around 2000 MW is 
reserved for positive mFRR and is – under normal 
conditions – not available for solving congestions. We state 
that the integration of these segments reduces a liquidity split, 
which is particularly valid if a balancing energy market and a 
redispatch market coexist. Bids in this MSI option are used 
for both imbalance and grid issues. In certain cases, an 
activated bid could even contribute to balancing the system 
while solving congestions simultaneously. Even though the 
possibility of optimization between both is limited, this would 
improve overall efficiency. Although a quantification of this 
effect for Germany is still pending, research provides 
evidence for this argumentation [8]. Furthermore, we argue 
that an integrated market potentially reduces transaction costs 
and eliminates arbitrage possibilities if bids from one market 
are used for several purposes instead of having two parallel 
segments. Currently, there is a significant overlap of suppliers 
between both segments also because these segments have 
similar characteristics.  
  
b) Influence on price formation 
The following analysis shows how price formation is 
potentially influenced. If the BA and CM are combined there 
is no direct link to a change of spot prices. However, 
opportunity considerations and a changed revenue 
expectation could influence prices on the ID. 
Regarding balancing and imbalance prices, the EBGL 
specifies a certain restriction: In case balancing energy bids 
are activated for purposes other than balancing, the price of 
these activated balancing energy bids shall not determine the 
IP [9]. 
To understand the interdependencies, the calculation of the IP 
shall briefly be explained. For every quarter hour the cost for 
the aFRR and the mFRR activation are summed up. This 
amount is divided by the resulting energy imbalance of the 
respective ISP. 
We use the following simplified example in Figure 3 showing 
a possible distribution of an integrated market merit order. 




Figure 3: Common merit-order list for both BA and CM activation 
The marginal price for all activations is . However, as “bids 
activated for internal congestion management shall not set the 
marginal price of balancing energy” [9], a different approach 
is needed. In our example, the highest bid activated for 
balancing purposes is ̅. Still, this marginal price is 
influenced by the third bid activated to solve a congestion, 
because otherwise – without an integrated solution – the 
marginal price for balancing energy would be lower. In both 
cases the IP is influenced because balancing energy costs are 
higher compared to the status-quo. One solution could be to 
calculate a theoretical marginal price  as if there was no bid 
used for CM.5 Such an approach could mitigate undesired 
influences on the IP. 
 
c) Effect on market participants 
This MSI can have numerous effects on market 
participants whereby we will focus upon a selection. 
In case of an existing separate BA and CM, the MSI 
would reduce the decision making problem of the market 
participants if both segments are entirely unified on one 
platform. 
In this MSI – in contrast to the current situation - marginal 
pricing is assumed, which has an impact on the revenue 
structure of the market participants. Moreover, locational 
value is given to a market participant’s asset and can lead to 
                                                          
5 Besides this approach, one can argue that as soon as congestion appears, 
there is not only one marginal price and hence, different marginal values of 
balancing energy on both sides of the congestion exist. 
an increase in the producer surplus.6 Corresponding 
increasing cost can arise for the TSO. The cost that occurs for 
CM measures are – equivalent to the current situation – 
socialized via grid tariffs. 
 
B. Integration of ID and CM 
a) Market Liquidity 
If the TSO participates passively on the ID and only 
accepts existing orders we assume that market participants on 
the ID have priority access to bids and offers (i.e. market 
orders match first during continuous trade). The TSO uses 
remaining (i.e. non-matched) orders to not remove liquidity 
from market participants. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
TSO activates bids and offers which could have been 
activated later in the timescale of the continuous ID. 
 Looking at the trading volume we can state that, in 
addition to normal trading, also bids for CM measures are 
traded on the ID platform. In the case of 2015 the trading 
volume on the ID in the German-Austrian bidding zone was 
38 TWh. As a comparison: 8 TWh for each, upward and 
downward regulation was required for CM in 2015 [2]. At 
this stage of research we cannot estimate which share of the 
CM could be performed on the ID. But we can state that the 
trading volume on the ID increases with this MSI option. To 
specify this evaluation and assess how the liquidity changes 
for the particular market participants, first the market design 
needs to be defined in more detail. 
 
b) Influence on price formation 
In this MSI option the TSO is trading on the ID platform, 
where prices of orders can be accepted that would not have 
been accepted without the participation of the TSO. Hence, 
the TSO has an influence on prices on the ID. If the TSO is 
actively trading on the ID, the influence on prices can be 
considered to be higher than with a passive participation of 
the TSO. However, we state that even without an explicit 
integration of market segments there are interdependencies 
between market segments due to opportunity considerations. 
The IP is not directly influenced by this MSI. However, 
since 2012 the IP is coupled with the ID price to prevent 
profit opportunities from an imbalanced BRP [12]. As the ID 
price is influenced, also the IP is indirectly influenced as 
often as this coupling takes place. In 2015 a coupling with the 
ID took place 7% of the time. We expect that this MSI has a 
direct influence on the ID prices and an indirect influence on 
the IP.  
 
c) Effect on market participants  
This MSI option can have numerous effects on market 
participants whereby we will focus upon a selection. 
In case of an existing separate ID and CM market, the 
MSI would reduce the decision making problem of the 
market participants. This statement is not valid if the MSI 
poses an additional bid option for the market segments.  
                                                          
6 Please note that the potential locational value results from a market-based 
redispatch regime and not from the MSI itself.  
As the obligatory locational information needs to be given 
in this MSI, the market participants have to trade for their 
specific units and cannot optimize their portfolio to the 
current extent. 
Furthermore, we expect a change of the revenue structure. 
By giving the TSO the possibility to solve redispatch issues 
via the ID, locational value is given to a market participants 
asset and can lead to an increase in the producer surplus. 
Corresponding increasing cost can arise for the TSO. The 
cost that occurs for CM measures are – equivalent to the 
current situation – socialized via grid tariffs. 
We therefore expect various effects on the different 
market participants.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper discusses options for the future short-term 
market design. In particular, we develop a conceptual basis 
for a possible integration of currently separated short-term 
market segments. Market segment integration (MSI) is 
defined as the interaction between and possible combination 
of market segments. Thereby an integration of market 
segments does not necessarily lead to a unified market for the 
integrated market segments but in our understanding also 
includes lower degrees of integration that allows for certain 
interactions. For the integration option BA and CM as well as 
ID and CM, we determine the basic design features such as 
product specifications, settlement structure or temporal 
aspects. A profound list of central criteria enables the 
evaluation of MSI. We evaluate a selection of criteria for the 
illustrated MSI options and present both positive (e.g. an 
increase of liquidity) and negative (e.g. possible distortions 
on price formation) effects. Even without any integration, 
there are interdependencies between market segments if 
market parties need to choose where to trade flexibility and 
arbitrage possibilities exist. MSI addresses these interactions 
and tries to develop potential solutions for emerging 
problems. 
This paper opens up a wide range of possibilities for 
further research. The design for the MSI options can be 
specified in more detail for the options to integrate the ID and 
the CM as well as the option to integrate the BA and CM. 
Also the concrete design of the two MSI options that have not 
been addressed in this paper can be concretized and analyzed 
with the provided criteria catalogue. Along with ongoing 
concretization of the MSI design, the evaluation can be 
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